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Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to establish empirically that, contrary to the view best
represented by von Fintel (1999), the licensing of NPIs can be disrupted by presup-
positions. We provide original data in English and Romance, and make the novel
observation that weak NPIs are sensitive to some but not all presuppositions, while
strong NPIs are sensitive to all of them. Section 1 presents evidence in support of
our claim; section 2 argues that presuppositions should be included in the meaning
relevant for NPI licensing and draws a parallel with implicatures; section 3 exposes
the ﬂaws of Strawson-entailment, which ensures licensing in the presence of pre-
suppositions; in section 4, we offer reasons to prefer our theory of licensing based
on strict downward entailingness.
As a preliminary clariﬁcation, we state the licensing condition we adopt in
the paper:
(1) Licensing Condition (after Gajewski 2005):
An NPI   is licensed in a sentence S only if there is a constituent   of S
containing   such that   is Downward Entailing with respect to the position
of  .
(2) A constituent   is Downward Entailing with respect to the position of  
(    D ) iff the function  x.  [ /v ] g[v  x] is Downward Entailing (a
function F is DE iff for all A, B in the domain of F such that A   B, F(B)
  F(A), where ‘ ’ stands for cross-categorial entailment).
1. Evidence
We produce data which evidence the disrupting effect of some presupposition trig-
gers on licensing: the ﬁrst subsection deals with weak NPIs, i.e. any, ever, care
to, bother with, and the second subsection covers strong NPIs such as in years/
months/weeks, until, either, all that or the minimizers lift a ﬁnger, budge an inch,
sleep a wink.
Thanks to Philippe Schlenker, to Natasha Abner, Daniel B¨ uring, Gennaro Chierchia, Michelan-
gelo Falco, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox, Asia Furmanska, Jon Gajewski, Benjamin George, Irene
Heim, Nicolas Lacasse, Robyn Orﬁtelli, Nathaniel Porter, Matteo Residori, J’aime Roemer, Craig
Sailor, Molly Shilman, Benjamin Spector, Dominique Sportiche, Chad Vicenik, and to the audiences
at the seminar on presupposition taught by Philippe Schlenker at UCLA in the fall of 2007, and at the
Syntax-Semantics Seminar at UCLA. This work was supported in part by NSF grant BCS-0617316.
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To our knowledge, the disruptive potential of too has never been noticed.
(3) Context: Mary read some interesting book.1
a. *I don’t think [John]F read anything interesting too.
b. I don’t think [John]F read something interesting too.
c. Presupposition of (3b): Somebody other than John read something inter-
esting.
Crucially, the ungrammaticality of (3a) is not due to some incompatibility between
too and the negation, as shown by the well-formedness of (3b).
The singular deﬁnite article and both are disruptors as well (this observation
is not new, unlike the one about too, see Lahiri 1998, Giannakidou 2006, Guerzoni
and Sharvit 2007 inter alia):
(4) Context: There is exactly one student who read some books on NPIs.
a. *The student who read any books on NPIs is selling them.
b. The student who read books on NPIs is selling them.
c. Presupposition of (4b): There is exactly one student who read books on
NPIs.
(5) Context: Exactly two students read some linguistics books.
a. *Both students who read any linguistics books have applied to the depart-
ment.
b. Both students who read linguistics books have applied to the department.
c. Presupposition of (5b): There are exactly two students who read linguis-
tics books.
The equivalents of too, singular the and both are disruptors in French and Italian
as well. These two languages feature several other disruptors, beyond the ones just
mentioned: for example an NPI in the complement clause of a French cognitive
factive predicate like savoir ‘know’, r´ ealiser ‘realize’, se rendre compte ‘become
aware’, etc. and their Italian equivalents is not licensed (but a weak NPI would be
in English), despite the presence of a superordinate negation (i.e. a DE function):
(6) Context: Marie is the best player in the tournament.
a. *Jean
Jean
ne
NEG
sait
knows
pas
NEG
que
that
Marie
Marie
a
have.IND
la
the
moindre
slightest
chance
chance
de
of
gagner (French)
win
‘Jean doesn’t know that Marie has any chance to win.’
1In this example and in the rest of the paper, we supply contexts in order to avoid unacceptability
due to a presupposition failure. We also spell out presuppositions; for ungrammatical sentences, we
provide a grammatical paraphrase and its presupposition.
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c. Presupposition of (6b): Marie has some chance to win.
When the verb penser ‘think’, which is not a presupposition trigger, is substituted
for the verb savoir ‘know’, the disruption effect vanishes:
(7) a. Jean
Jean
ne
NEG
pense
thinks
pas
NEG
que
that
Marie
Marie
a/ait
have.IND/SUBJ
la
the
moindre
slightest
chance
chance
de
of
gagner (French)
win
‘Jean doesn’t think that Marie has any chance to win.’
b. Presupposition: None.
In Italian, an epistemic predicate, when negated, tends to require the subjunctive
mood in the embedded clause; the indicative is also possible though, but in this
conﬁguration, it triggers the presupposition that the speaker holds true the comple-
ment clause (Homer 2007). The following pair shows that the indicative, unlike the
subjunctive, disrupts the licensing of the NPI mai ‘ever’:
(8) Context: Maria has visited Paris several times.
a. *Gianni
Gianni
non
NEG
pensa
thinks
che
that
Maria
Maria
` e
be.IND
mai
ever
andata
gone
a
to
Parigi
Paris (Italian)
‘Gianni doesn’t think that Maria has ever been to Paris.’
b. Gianni non pensa che Maria ` e andata a Parigi.
c. Presupposition of (8b): The speaker believes that Maria has been to Paris.
(9) a. Gianni
Gianni
non
NEG
pensa
thinks
che
that
Maria
Maria
sia
be.SUBJ
mai
ever
andata
gone
a
to
Parigi
Paris
‘Gianni doesn’t think that Maria has ever been to Paris.’
b. Presupposition: None.
In the same connection, a cognitive factive verb like se souvenir ‘remember’ in
French allows the indicative/subjunctive alternation when negated. The indicative
yields the presupposition that the complement clause is true, and acts as a disruptor,
while the subjunctive doesn’t:
(10) Context: Marie warned Jean against drinking alcohol.
a. *Jean
Jean
ne
NEG
se
REFL
souvient
remembers
pas
NEG
que
that
Marie
Marie
lui
to-him
a
have.IND
dit
said
quoi
anything
que ce soit (French)
‘Jean doesn’t remember that Marie told him anything.’
b. Jean ne se souvient pas que Marie lui a dit quelque chose (‘something’).
c. Presupposition of (10b): Marie said something to Jean.
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Jean
ne
NEG
se
REFL
souvient
remembers
pas
NEG
que
that
Marie
Marie
lui
to-him
ait
have.SUBJ
dit
said
quoi
anything
que ce soit (French)
‘Jean doesn’t remember that Marie told him anything.’
b. Presupposition: None.
In both French and Italian, the effect of presupposition is also felt with the counter-
parts of the triggers why and how (while NPIs are normally licensed in questions).
(12) Context: Marie wrote three letters to her mother.
a. *Pourquoi/Comment
Why/How
Marie
Marie
a-t-
has
elle
she
´ ecrit
written
quoi
anything
que ce soit ` a
to
sa
her
m` ere ? (French)
mother?
‘Why/How has Marie written anything to her mother?’
b. Pourquoi/Comment Marie a-t-elle ´ ecrit ` a sa m` ere ?
c. Presupposition of (12b): Marie wrote something to her mother.
Interestingly, why and how do not always trigger a presupposition: they do when
the clausemate verb is in the indicative mood (as in 12a), but they don’t when it is
in the inﬁnitive or in the conditional mood (as in 13a below). The disruption effect
correlates exactly with the presence of a presupposition:
(13) a. Pourquoi/Comment
Why/How
Marie
Marie
´ ecrirait-
write.COND
elle
she
quoi
anything
que ce soit ` a
to
sa
her
m` ere ? (French)
mother?
‘Why/How would Marie write anything to her mother?’
b. Presupposition: None.
1.2. Strong NPIs
ThereisaremarkabledifferencebetweenweakandstrongNPIs: thelicensingofthe
former (as we’ve just seen) is vulnerable to some but not all presupposition triggers,
whereas the licensing of the latter is consistently disrupted by all presupposition
triggers. This is true in English, French and Italian.
(14) Context: John got Mary an apartment, although they were not friends.
a. *Why did John lift a ﬁnger to help Mary?
b. Why did John help Mary?
c. Presupposition of (14b): John helped Mary.
(15) Context: Mary must have been helped, she can’t have lifted the piano alone.
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b. I doubt that it was John who helped Mary.
c. Presupposition of (15b): Someone helped Mary.
(16) Context: John slept a solid 10 hours last night.
a. *Mary doesn’t know that John slept a wink.
b. Mary doesn’t know that John slept.
c. Presupposition of (16b): John slept.
(17) Context: John visited Mary three times over the past 10 years.
a. *Only John has visited Mary in years.
b. Only John has visited Mary.
c. Presupposition of (17b): John has visited Mary.
(18) Context: Betty was told that her husband visited Mary three times over the
past 10 years.
a. *Betty is sorry that her husband has visited Mary in years.
b. Betty is sorry that her husband has visited Mary.
c. Presupposition of (18b): Betty thinks that her husband has visited Mary.
(19) Context: Bill was told that Mary exercised last week.
a. *Bill is surprised that Mary has exercised in years.
b. Bill is surprised that Mary has exercised.
c. Presupposition of (19b): Bill thinks that Mary has exercised.
2. Analysis
In the previous section, we observed that presupposition triggers are potential dis-
ruptors. Is it to say that the mere presence of a presupposition trigger in the con-
stituent upon which licensing is checked can sufﬁce to cause a disruption? To an-
swer this question, let’s turn to the very signiﬁcant minimal pair formed by (3a)
(repeated as 20a below) and (21a), in which either replaces too:
(20) Context: Mary read some interesting book.
a. *I don’t think [John]F read anything interesting too.
b. Presupposition of (3b): Somebody other than John read something inter-
esting.
(21) Context: Mary didn’t read anything interesting.
a. I don’t think [John]F read anything interesting either.
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ing.
Given that too and either are very close in meaning but differ with respect to their
presuppositions, it is reasonable to think that it is this difference which explains
the contrast between (20a) and (21a): contrary to sentence (21b), sentence (20b),
which expresses the presupposition of the closest grammatical paraphrase of (20a),
contains no subconstituent that is downward entailing with respect to the position
of the object of the verb read (the same position that anything occupies in 20a).
This discrepancy can only matter to the occurrence of anything in (20a) and (21a)
if the process of checking the licensing of the NPI involves considering an enriched
meaning which includes, for each sentence, the presuppositions it carries.
We thus assume that, alongside the plain meaning of a given sentence  ,
grammar provides an enriched meaning of   (henceforth labeled the µ meaning of
  and noted µ(     )), which is the conjunction of the assertive content of   and
of (the conjunction of) its presuppositions;2 it is the µ meaning that counts for NPI
licensing.
The effect of the µ operator is to turn a trivalent meaning into a bivalent
one:3
(22) Let E be a trivalent meaning. µ(E) = 0 iff E = # or 0 and µ(E) = 1 iff E = 1
In order to show that the ungrammatical (20a) (repeated as 23a below) doesn’t pro-
vide a downward entailing environment for the NPI anything, we check in (23b)-
(23c) whether some constituent of type <t > of the sentence supports an inference
from sets to subsets in the relevant position (the set of novels is a subset of the set
of books). The constituent we examine is the whole sentence, for the embedded
clause lacks any expression denoting a DE function (and as such cannot be a DE
constituent). Importantly, we compute an inference from a µ meaning to another µ
meaning:
(23) a. *I don’t think [John]F read anything interesting too.
b. I don’t think [John]F read a book too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John read a book.
c. I don’t think [John]F read a novel too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John read a novel.
(24) µ( (23b) )=¬[ abook [ y. read(j,y)]]  x[x =j  abook [ y. read(x,y)]]
(25) µ(  (23c)  )=¬[  a novel  [ y. read(j,y)]]    x[x =j     a novel  [ y.
read(x,y)]]
2Given the deﬁnition of the µ operator, we are led to stipulate that the licensing condition should
require that the constituent upon which licensing is checked be of type < t >. We thus propose the
following formulation: An NPI   is licensed in a sentence S only if there is a constituent   of type
<t > of S containing   such that the function  x.µ(   [ /v ]  g[v  x]) is Downward Entailing.
3As an alternative to building conjunctions, we could adopt the rule that in a trivalent framework,
F entails G iff whenever   F   = 1,   G   = 1. Thanks to B. Spector for suggesting this solution; we
will use conjunctions (µ meanings) as a pedagogical device.
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The µ meaning of (23b) fails to entail the µ meaning of (23c), leading to ungram-
maticality. We now apply the same procedure to the grammatical (21a), repeated as
(26a) below:
(26) a. I don’t think [John]F read anything interesting either.
b. I don’t think [John]F read a book either.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John didn’t read a book.
c. I don’t think [John]F read a novel either.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John didn’t read a novel.
(27) µ(  (26b)  )=¬[  a book  [ y. read(j,y)]]    x[x =j   ¬  a book  [ y.
read(x,y)]]
(28) µ(  (26c)  )=¬[  a novel  [ y. read(j,y)]]    x[x =j   ¬  a novel  [ y.
read(x,y)]]
µ(  (26b)  )   µ(  (26c)  )
Our claim that the makeup of the presuppositions is a crucial matter for NPI licens-
ing yields an interesting prediction: it should be possible to construct a grammat-
ical sentence whose LF exhibits the same scopal relationships between negation,
too and the NPI as the ill-formed (23a) (namely NOT > TOO > ANY), but whose
presupposition is DE with respect to the relevant position. The position the NPI
occupies in the sentence would thus be DE in the assertive content as well as in the
presupposition, leading to grammaticality.4
Such a sentence exists, witness (29a) below:
(29) Context: Many students in Mary’s class read a very interesting book.
a. I don’t think [anybody in John’s class]F read something interesting too.
b. Presupposition: Somebody other than anybody in John’s class read some-
thing interesting.
(30) a. I don’t think [a student]F read something interesting too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than a student read something interest-
ing.
b. I don’t think [a French student]F read something interesting too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than a French student read something
interesting.
(31) µ(  (30a)  )=¬ x[x   student     something interesting  [ y. read(x,y)]]  
 x[x    student     something interesting  [ y. read(x,y)]]
4Let F and G be DE functions. For all A, B such that B   A, F(A)   G(A)   F(B)   G(B).
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   x[x    French student     something interesting  [ y. read(x,y)]]
µ(  (30a)  )   µ(  (30b)  )
The contrast between (23a) and (29a) shows that we rightly invoke the presupposi-
tion triggered by too as the cause of the ill-formedness of the former.
2.1. µ Meanings and Chierchia’s Strengthened Meanings
Our proposal, which points at presuppositions as sources of disruption, is inter-
estingly parallel to the one that Chierchia (2004) makes. Chierchia accounts for
the intervention effects caused by and, every, numerals, because-clauses, always,
etc. by invoking the role of another kind of inference, namely an indirect scalar
implicature.
(33) a. I doubt that every housemate of Sue has potatoes.
b. *I doubt that every housemate of Sue has any potatoes.
c. *LF: Doubt ... every ... NPI.
Chierchia’s intuition is that and, every, numerals, etc. form a natural class: they are
all strong scalar items (e.g. <every, most, some>, <and, or>). When placed under
a DE operator, they yield an indirect scalar implicature. Grammar provides two
meanings for a given sentence  , namely the plain meaning, i.e the truth conditions
of  , and the strong one, noted      s, i.e. the conjunction of the truth conditions
and implicatures of  . It is the latter meaning which is relevant for NPI licensing.5
(34) *It is not the case that everybody has any roses.
(35) a. It is not the case that everybody has roses.
Scalar Implicature: Somebody has roses.
b. It is not the case that everybody has blue roses.
Scalar Implicature: Somebody has blue roses.
(36)   (35a)  s=¬[ x(  roses  ( y. x have y))]    x(  roses  ( y. x have y))
(37)   (35b)  s=¬[ x(  blue roses  ( y. x have y))]    x(  blue roses  ( y. x have
y))
  (35a)  s      (35b)  s
The discovery that presuppositions can disrupt licensing brings to light interesting
commonalities between the two types of inferences.
5This presentation of Chierchia (2004) is a blatant oversimpliﬁcation: in particular, we are pre-
tending that this proposal features a licensing condition in terms of DEness, which is not in fact the
case: the condition invokes the widening of the domain of quantiﬁcation brought about by the NPI,
and this widening is only licit if it leads to strenghtening.
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The present paper offers the ﬁrst touchstone that can differentiate local accommo-
dation and non-projection on the one hand, and non-triggering on the other.
2.2.1. Local Accommodation and Non-Projection
The disruption effect remains even when the presupposition is locally accommo-
dated (i.e. made part of the assertive content in the scope of negation), as in (39):
(38) The King of France is not bald, because there is no King of France.
(39) *Pierre
Pierre
ne
NEG
s’
REFL
aperc ¸oit
perceives
pas
NEG
que
that
Marie
Marie
a
has
la
the
moindre
slightest
chance,
chance,
car
for
elle
she
n’
NEG
a
has
aucune
no
chance (French)
chance
‘Pierre doesn’t realize that Marie has any chance, for she has no chance.’
Similarly, the effect remains if the presupposition is satisﬁed, as in (40) (the pre-
supposition of the consequent is satisﬁed by the antecedent):
(40) *I doubt that if Peter went to Paris, [Mary]F too ever went to Paris.
Once triggered, presuppositions cause a disruption, as if the system responsible for
NPI licensing processed them blindly. Strikingly, the intervention effects studied
by Chierchia also persist when the inference (a scalar implicature) is defeated:
(41) *The students have no background whatsoever, so I doubt that every student
has any background.
2.2.2. Non-Triggering
The disruption effect does not obtain when the presupposition is simply not trig-
gered. This can be illustrated with a French cognitive factive predicate like s’aper-
cevoir ‘realize’, which doesn’t yield a presupposition when placed in the antecedent
of a subjunctive conditional:
(42) a. Si
If
Pierre
Pierre
s’
REFL
apercevait
perceived
que
that
Marie
Marie
ait
have.SUBJ
chang´ e
changed
quoi
anything
que
ce soit,
,
il
he
serait
would-be
en
in
col` ere
wrath
‘If Pierre found out that Marie changed anything, he would be mad.’
b. Presupposition: None.
A similar phenomenon occurs with implicatures. A numeral like 11 is not always
high on its scale, and it can actually be the weakest element of a truncated scale
(e.g. in a context where one groups numerals by multiples of 11): then no indirect
scalar implicature is triggered, hence the grammaticality of (43a):
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onship. (Chierchia 2004)
b. *I didn’t meet eleven people who read any of my poetry. (Ch. 2004)
3. Strawson-Entailment
Our novel observations and the consequent claim about the disruption caused by
presuppositions run counter to the commonly accepted view that such an effect
simply does not exist. It must be said that a number of presupposition triggers, not
only do not disrupt licensing, but seem to cause it. This is notoriously true of sorry,
surprise and only.
(44) John is sorry that Mary bought any car.
(45) Meredith is surprised that John has any complaints about the hotel.
(46) Only John ever went to Chicago.
Consider for example (44). Leaving aside for the moment the innovation introduced
in the previous section, i.e. µ meanings, it doesn’t seem that the inference between
(47a) and (47b) goes through, since one can easily imagine scenarios in which John
is sorry that Mary bought a car, and the only car she bought is a Mazda (in which
case 47b is undeﬁned):
(47) a. John is sorry that Mary bought a car.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a car.
b. John is sorry that Mary bought a Honda.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a Honda.
(47a)   ? (47b)
But the inference will be truth-preserving if it is part of contextual knowledge that
Mary bought a Honda.6 Under this assumption, whenever (47a) is true, (47b) is
also true, since the assertive content of the former entails the assertive content of
the latter, and the latter is, by hypothesis, deﬁned.
This is the intuition underlying the widely acknowledged theory of NPI li-
censing defended in von Fintel (1999): according to von Fintel, the licensing con-
dition should be weakened, since NPIs are licensed despite the presence of the
presupposition triggered by only and the emotive factives surprise and sorry. The
weakening consists in granting all presuppositions of the consequence when the va-
lidity of a downward inference is assessed. This is the spirit of so-called Strawson-
entailment, upon which this theory rests. Hence the following deﬁnition of Straw-
son Downward Entailingness:
6For legitimate qualms about this claim (after all, it is conceivable, assuming that Mary bought
a Honda, that John is sorry that she bought a car but relatively satisﬁed that she chose this particular
brand), see von Fintel (1999).
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A function f of type < ,t> is Strawson Downward Entailing (SDE) iff for
all x, y of type   such that x   y and f(x) is deﬁned: f(y)   f(x)
The licensing condition (weaker than the one we gave in section 1) argued for in
the paper is thus:
(49) von Fintel’s (1999) Licensing Condition (to be revised):
An NPI is only grammatical if it is in the scope of an   that is SDE.
This theory aims at characterizing licensers, that is to say, expressions in the scope
of which NPIs can occur. It bears saying that it only targets the licensing of English
weak NPIs (and is therefore silent about languages other than English and about
strong NPIs).
Its two main tenets are:
1. NPIs are licensed by operators (as opposed to environments). This is what
one might call the syntactic component of the theory;
2. A necessary condition for being a suitable licenser is Strawson Downward
Entailingness. This is the semantic component of the theory.
This theory departs from ours with regard to its two main tenets: our theory invokes
the strict downward entailingness of environments. To be sure, von Fintel’s theory
appears to fare better than ours as far as only and emotive factives (sorry, surprise)
are concerned (but see section 4 for discussion):
(50) a. John is sorry that Mary bought a car.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a car.
b. John is sorry that Mary bought a Honda.
Presupposition: John believes that Mary bought a Honda.
(51) µ(  (50a)  )=  be-sorry  [ˆ  a car  ( y. m buy y)](j)     believe  [ˆ  a
car  ( y. m buy y)](j) 7
(52) µ(  (50b)  )=  be-sorry  [ˆ  a Honda  ( y. m buy y)](j)     believe  [ˆ  a
Honda  ( y. m buy y)](j)
µ(  (50a)  )    µ(  (50b)  )
(50a)   Strawson (50b) (SDE)
7In this formula,   be-sorry   is the assertive content of the bracketed predicate (no new presup-
position is introduced).
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The theory, in its original formulation, wrongly predicts that an NPI should be
licensed in the scope of the singular deﬁnite article:
(53) (Context: There is exactly one student who read some books on NPIs.)
*The student who read any books on NPIs is selling them.
(54) a. The student who read a book is selling it.
Presupposition: There is exactly one student who read a book.
b. The student who read a novel is selling it.
Presupposition: There is exactly one student who read a novel.
(54a)   Strawson (54b) (SDE)
Owing to the existence and uniqueness presuppositions carried by singular deﬁnite
descriptions, in any given model the student who read a book and the student who
read a novel are one and the same person: so whatever is predicated of one can
also be predicated of the other. This ensures the validity of inferences from sets to
subsets but also from subsets to sets. This description of the problem also contains
a remedy to it, ﬁrst identiﬁed by Lahiri (1998): one should exclude from the list of
suitable licensers the singular deﬁnite article, both, and in general, those functions
which are Strawson Downward Entailing and Strawson Upward Entailing at the
same time:
(55) Strawson Upward Entailingness:
A function f of type < ,t> is Strawson Upward Entailing (SUE) iff for all
x, y of type   such that x   y and f(y) is deﬁned: f(x)   f(y)
In light of these new facts, we amend von Fintel’s licensing condition in the follow-
ing way:
(56) von Fintel/Lahiri’s (vFL) Licensing Condition:
AnNPIisonlygrammaticalifitisinthescopeofan  thatisSDE,non SUE.
The class of suitable licensers (SDE, non SUE) is a proper superset of the class
of DE operators. The new licensing condition enables the theory to capture the
ungrammaticality of NPIs in the restrictor of singular the and also in the restrictor
of both:
(57) (Context: Exactly two students read some linguistics books.)
*Both students who read any linguistics books have applied to the depart-
ment.
(58) a. Both students who read books have applied to the department.
Presupposition: There is a set of exactly two students who read books.
b. Both students who read novels have applied to the department.
Presupposition: There is a set of exactly two students who read novels.
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(58b)   Strawson (58a) (SUE)
Notice that singular the and both are not problematic for the µ theory:
µ(  (54a)  )    µ(  (54b)  )
µ(  (58a)  )    µ(  (58b)  )
Despite the ﬁx, the vFL account can be shown to be ﬂawed, as it is too weak to
explain the disruption caused by some presupposition triggers scoping above an
NPI and below an SDE, non SUE operator. These are what one might want to call
intervention effects (more shortcomings are presented in Homer 2008).
3.2. Intervention
Supporters of the vFL account should worry about the prediction it makes regarding
the scopal conﬁguration NOT > THESG > NPI (by THESG, we mean the singular
deﬁnite article). The necessary condition that the NPI should be in the scope of
some SDE, non SUE operator is met, because negation is one such operator (al-
though the singular deﬁnite article, sandwiched between not and the NPI, is not).
However, the fact is that the NPI anything is not licensed in the following sentence,
as is correctly predicted by the µ theory:8
(59) (Context: Two men are ﬂirting with Mary; one of the two keeps giving her
presents, while the other never offered her anything.)
*I don’t think the man who gave Mary anything is very smart.
So the syntactic component of the account (operator-based licensing) appears to be
incorrect. But the vFL account could still be right, provided it acknowledged that
licensing is checked on environments, for the NPI anything in (59) occurs in an
SDE, SUE environment (‘I don’t think the man who gave Mary a Honda is very
smart’ Strawson-entails ‘I don’t think the man who gave Mary a car is very smart’,
because the deﬁnite descriptions in the two sentences refer to the same individual).
Alas, the disruption caused by too in (3a) (repeated as 60a below) poses a
critical problem to the von Fintel/Lahiri theory.
(60) Context: Mary read some interesting book.
8It would be impossible to rephrase the vFL licensing condition by making the negative stipula-
tion that an NPI must not be in the scope of an SDE, SUE operator, given the grammaticality of the
scopal conﬁguration THESG > NOT > NPI:
(1) Context: There is some student who knew nothing about linguistics.
a. The student who didn’t know any linguistics passed all his syntax exams.
b. Presupposition: There is some student who knew nothing about linguistics.
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b. *LF: not... too... any
This example invalidates both the syntactic and the semantic components of the the-
ory: it shows that the material intermediate between negation (i.e. a bona ﬁde SDE,
non SUE operator) and the NPI can have a disruptive effect on licensing, and the
effect is due to the presuppositional nature of this intermediate material. Thanks to
the grammatical (29a) repeated as (61a) below (thanks also to the facts about either,
see 21a), we know that it is not the mere presence of too in this scopal conﬁgura-
tion which precludes the occurrence of the NPI, but, rather, the monotonicity of the
presupposition it triggers:
(61) Context: Many students in Mary’s class read a very interesting book.
a. I don’t think [anybody in John’s class]F read something interesting too.
b. Presupposition: Somebody other than anybody in John’s class read some-
thing interesting.
Therefore the intervention effect in (60a) consists in a break in the monotonicity
of the environment (against the syntactic component), which is crucially not DE
(downward inferences from 62a to 62b are not licensed on µ meanings), although
it is SDE, non SUE (against the semantic component).
(62) a. I don’t think [John]F read a book too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John read a book.
b. I don’t think [John]F read a novel too.
Presupposition: Somebody other than John read a novel.
µ(  (62a)  )    µ(  (62b)  )
(62a)   Strawson (62b) (SDE)
(62b)    Strawson (62a) (non SUE)
4. Discussion
Taking stock, the vFL account is too weak and the µ theory is too strong. Should
the competition end in a tie?
4.1. Hierarchy
Let’s ﬁrst take a better view of the data in English and in French. In Tables 1 and
2, a star indicates that the trigger is a disruptor, and a check mark indicates that it
isn’t.
To this date, we haven’t been able to determine the criteria that would pre-
dict whether a given trigger is a disruptor or not. But the tables are telling nonethe-
less. English is strictly more permissive than French: the set of French disruptors is
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NPIs: factives article
Weak:  (rhetorical)   * * *  
Strong: * * * * * *
NPIs: Surprise Only It-Cleft Again Before Stop Start
Weak:              
Strong: * * * ?? * *  
Table 1: NPI Licensing in the Scope of Presuppositional Triggers in English
Why/How Cognitive Sing. deﬁnite Both Too Regret
NPIs: factives article
Weak: * * * * *  /?
Strong: * * * * * *
NPIs: Surprise Only It-Cleft Again Before Stop Start
Weak:              
Strong: * * * ?? * *  
Table 2: NPI Licensing in the Scope of Presuppositional Triggers in French
apropersupersetofthesetofEnglishdisruptors. Inturn, thesetofItaliandisruptors
(not displayed here) is a proper superset of the set of French disruptors (e.g. dispi-
acere ‘regret’ is a clear disruptor). This suggests an implicational hierarchy among
triggers, and the cross-linguistic differences instruct us where to put the breaks (the
hierarchy is only partial at this point):
(63) stop, before, it-cleft, only, surprise > regret > cognitive factives >
too, singular the, both
If a trigger on the scale is a disruptor in language L, any trigger lower on the scale
will also be a disruptor in L, but the converse is not true (  >   reads: ‘  is higher
on the scale than  ’). Another important lesson to draw from the tables above is
that all strong NPIs in the languages we’ve considered fall prey to the disruption
effect of presuppositions, while only some weak NPIs do.9
9The presupposition of start is DE w.r.t. the relevant position, so its innocuousness, both for
weak NPIs and for strong ones, comes as no surprise:
(1) Context: John is a young man who is only interested in poetry, but he might change when he
grows older.
a. John hasn’t started showing any interest in business.
b. Presupposition: John hasn’t shown interest for business in the past.
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The vFL account might look like the mirror image of the µ theory but it is not, and
here’s why. First of all, imagine we extended the vFL account to deal with strong
NPIs (which it doesn’t). According to Zwarts (1996), strong NPIs must be licensed
by an Anti-Additive (AA) function (e.g. ‘fewer than three students’ is not AA, but
‘no student’ is):
(64) Anti-Additivity:
A function f is AA iff (f(X)   f(Y))    f(X   Y) (Zwarts 1996)
Anti-Additive
Downward Entailing
(i) f(X)   f(Y)   f(X   Y)
(ii) f(X   Y)   f(X)   f(Y)
(iii) f(X)   f(Y)   f(X   Y)
Although only and emotive factives seem to create a suitable environment for weak
NPIs, they do not do so for strong ones. This is expected in the µ theory, as they
are not AA. In fact, they are Strawson Anti-Additive (SAA).
(65) Strawson Anti-Additivity:
A function f is Strawson Anti-Additive (SAA)
iff (f(X)   f(Y)) and f(X   Y) Strawson-entail each other.
Let us show that sorry is not AA (hence disrupts licensing, as desired), but is SAA:
(66) a. John is sorry that Mary is here and is sorry that Peter is here.
b.   John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.
c. SORRY(X)   SORRY(Y)   SORRY(X   Y) (Left to Right)
d.SORRY(X)   SORRY(Y)   Strawson SORRY(X   Y) (Left to Right)
(67) a. John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.
b.    John is sorry that Mary is here and is sorry that Peter is here.
c. SORRY(X   Y)    SORRY(X)   SORRY(Y) (Right to Left)
d.SORRY(X   Y)   Strawson SORRY(X)   SORRY(Y) (Right to Left)
Since sorry doesn’t license strong NPIs, the latter don’t need an SAA environ-
ment but an AA one. Now, what distinguishes Strawson Anti-Additivity from
Anti-Additivity tout court is, as the above shows, the right-to-left direction of the
equivalence, which is part of downward entailingness: in order to make the right
prediction, the vFL account should thus require, just like the µ theory, that strong
NPIs occur in a strictly DE environment. It would then need to state two separate li-
censing conditions: strong NPIs require strictly DE environments, while weak NPIs
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and only, vFL must stipulate that some triggers are disruptors for weak NPIs while
others aren’t. Once Strawson-entailment is in the picture and the licensing con-
dition of weak NPIs invokes it, what can distinguish too (a disruptor) and only (a
non disruptor), which are both SDE, non SUE if not brute force, or some unknown
property? Summing up, two stipulations are required in the vFL account: one is the
existence of two licensing conditions, the other is the marking of some triggers as
non disruptive.
On the other hand, the µ theory doesn’t need a separate licensing condition
for strong NPIs: it is a necessary condition for all NPIs, be they weak or strong,
that they occur in a DE environment (of course, strong NPIs are subject to some
further restrictions, but these must be assumed by both theories). On the other
hand, the µ theory must specify which presuppositions should contribute to the µ
meaning for the licensing of weak NPIs (keeping in mind that no decision has to
be made for strong NPIs, given that all presuppositions are included as far as they
are concerned). On the whole, the µ theory is thus more economical than the vFL
theory: its superiority lies in the fact that it makes one stipulation instead of two.
Still, one might complain that the stipulation it has to make (some but not
all presuppositions count for the µ meaning as far as weak NPIs are concerned) is
unsatisfactorily mysterious. But we think the µ theory is well designed to elucidate
the mystery: in effect, it treats the assertive content and the presupposition(s) of a
sentence   as being distinct objects. It is then conceivable that one is manipulated
in the absence of the other. If such a circumstance happens, i.e. if only the assertive
content of   contributes to the µ meaning, NPIs will be licensed provided that the
assertive content is DE w.r.t. their positions.
As a consequence, we would like to venture the idea, admittedly largely
speculative, that the licensing of weak NPIs and the licensing of strong NPIs do not
occur at the same stage (assuming the operations performed by the system follow
a sequence): suppose there are various classes of presuppositions, which are com-
puted by the system at different stages, and the classes of presuppositions as well as
the order of their computation are ﬁxed across languages (our implicational hierar-
chy is in fact a sketch of this architecture: the higher a trigger is on a scale, the later
its presupposition enters the system). And suppose that what varies, across cate-
gories of NPIs11 and across languages, is the stage at which licensing is checked, or
in other words, the stage at which the µ meaning gets computed: this would derive
the differing disruptive potentials of triggers, the weak/strong dissimilarity, and the
cross-linguistic variations. For example, checking the licensing of any in English
might happen before the presuppositions of cognitive factives are computed, while
the licensing of quoi que ce soit in French would be checked later; the presupposi-
10Gajewski (2008) independently arrives at the same conclusion, but departs from our proposal in
signiﬁcant respects, e.g. it resorts to Strawson-entailment and relies on an operator-based licensing
principle.
11It is natural to imagine that within a given language, the stage of licensing varies across NPIs
of the same category (i.e. weak or strong), although the data collected so far don’t corroborate this
hypothesis.
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Strong NPIs, which are characterized by their idiomatic nature (this is at least clear
for minimizers) could possibly belong to some very high level, and their licensing
be checked at a late stage, when all presuppositions have been computed (at any
rate the ones we’ve looked at).13 We predict that some language should exist in
which one of the high triggers on the scale, e.g. stop, is a disruptor for weak NPIs
(and all triggers below it are too).
Conclusion
This paper shows that presuppositions can affect NPI licensing: in doing so, it lends
decisive support to the view that inferences can disrupt licensing, and it deprives the
idea of Strawson-entailment of its empirical justiﬁcation.
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